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Roughly a decade has passed since the respective doyens of speech 
act theory and deconstruction confronted one another in an ill-fated, 
though by no means meaningless, attempt at communicating with one 
another in the Glyph papers.  As the "exchange" developed its readers 
soon began to realise that John R. Searle was not going to grant decon-
struction its fundamental critical claims, nor that Jacques Derrida was 
likely to abstain from poking fun at "Sari's" mechanical metaphysics, 
that the former could not but return to the Frege/Russell/  Austin/Ryle 
camp, while the latter was  bound to settle back in  his career in  the lineage, 
to put it  crudely, of Nietzsche, Husserl, Saussure and Heidegger. Thus 
the stand-off, pre-Hegelian, continues to mark philosophy. 
At the same time, judging by the enthusiasm with which the French 
philosopher was celebrated first in French and Comparative Literature 
departments and more recently across the Humanities, it seemed that 
literature was going to profit enormously from the Derridean critique of 
theorising in the West.  Viewed more soberly, what has actually hap-
pened is that literature has largely pillaged Derrida's philosophical 
system to shore up its Post-New Critical practice of free-play readings 
and a quite un-Derridean metaphoricity. 
It  is this double denial of Derrida'  s theoretical accomplishments by 
analytical philosophy and literary criticism which makes Rodolphe 
Gasche's book The Tain  of the Mirror  a significant and highly valuable 
contribution  to contemporary thought. By foregrounding the theoretical 
depth of Derrida's critique of philosophy GascM challenges the dis-
missal of deconstruction as rhetorical self-destruction; by  demonstrating 
its systemic nature GascM has managed to pull together the major 
theoretical strands in Derrida'  s oeuvre for the benefit of a large number 
of readers not familiar enough with the history of the philosophy of 
reflection.  Certainly, GascM pursues his goals by embedding decon-
struction firmly in its philosophical tradition.  And if  this relational 
reading at times appears to sharpen Derrida's contribution at the ex-
pense of those of his precursors, the bias should be noted; it could hardly 
put in question the book's overall achievement. 
The twin objections to a philosophical reading of Derrida, on the 
grounds that only the earlier work warrants such an approach and that 
it totalises a writing which is at pains to avoid subsummation, are met  by 
two answers.  The first is a quotation from Derrida's "The Time of a 
Thesis: Punctuations":1"all of the problems worked on in the Introduc-
tion to The Origin of Geometry 2have continued to organise the work I have 
subsequently attempted" (4); GascM's second response is to stress his 
aim of showing not so much the totality as the relative systematicity of 
Derrida's heterology as a dynamics of "infrastructures." 
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The  Tain  of the Mirror  has three main goals: to  situate Derrida's 
philosophy with respect to the problem of reflection; to "link together a 
multitude of motifs in Derrida's oeuvre in order to  demonstrate the 
consistent nature of  this philosophical enterprise"; and to  analyse a 
number of his concepts which have been"  absorbed into deconstruction-
ist criticism" (5). This triple aim is reflected in the three main parts of 
Gasche'  s study. Part I offers an overview of the philosophy of reflection 
as a basis for the analysis of Derrida'  s major concerns. Part II focuses on 
Derrida's thought from the perspective of "infrastructures" which, ac-
cording to Gasche, "seemed to represent the most economical way to 
conceptualize all of Derrida's proposed quasi-synthetic concepts" or 
"t!ndecidables" (7). In Part III the author has selected the terms "writ-
ing," "textuality," and "metaphor" to demonstrate the philosophical 
task they are meant to perform ip. Derrida'  s writing. All three Parts are 
linked at the same time with one another through the title metaphor of 
the "tain  of  the  mirror," that "lusterless tinfoil" which we  tend to repress. 
Derrida's philosophy, though not itself strictly a philosophy of reflec-
tion, is seen both as having grown out of that tradition and as being 
"engaged in the systematic exploration of that dull surface without 
which no reflection and ... no speculative activity would be possible" 
(6). 
It  is not feasible to trace Gasche's full argument in the brief frame of 
a review article, but not to attempt at  least an  outline of his analysis were 
to do an injustice to his book.  Without being able, then, to follow the 
author's many subordinated motifs this paper will present as faithfully 
as possible a summary narrative of Gasche's contentions.  Part I, ''To-
ward the Traits of Reflection," opens with a definition of philosophical 
reflection and ends by  bringing the history of the concept up to Derrida'  s 
immediate predecessors.  Useful in the discussion of philosophy since 
Plato, reflection becomes a principle par excellence only since Descartes. 
But since that moment "it has signified the turning away from any 
straightforward consideration of objects ...  toward a consideration  ofthe 
very experience in which objects are given" (13).  Consequently, reflec-
tion shifts from its emphasis on objects and .propositional contents to the 
"modalitites of object perception" and the subject (13).  The metaphysics 
of the "world" now turns into a "metaphysics of subjectivity." At this 
point Gasche draws a neat parallel between the emancipatory seed 
embedded in the Liberum est quod causa sui est, the cogito,  and Kant's 
transcendental investigation which isolates the "inner conditions that 
constitute the objects in general that present themselves to our experi-
ence" (14). With reference to the implied metaphoricity of light, Gasche 
now offers a preliminary definition: "reflection is the structure and the 
process of an operation that, in addition to designating the action of a 
mirror reproducing an object, implies that mirror's mirroring itself, by 
whicl). process the mirror is made to see itself" (16-17). 
If  Descartes turns the cogito into a cogitatum and Kant sees reflection 
as an enquiry into the "subjective conditions under which we are able to 
arrive at concepts," the Idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel requires 
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between the mirror and its object, as well as between the mirror and 
itself" (18,  21).  This, Gasche says, is achieved in Hegel's critique of 
reflection which inscribes reflection in  the domain of the Absolute and so 
overcomes the dualism of objectivity and subjectivity.  The concepts 
which mark this moment in Hegel's philosophy are those of "absolute 
reflection," "speculation" and "totality." It is the latter which leaves 
nothing unmediated and so can encompass all opposition as well as 
mediation itself.  Or, as Gasche puts it,"  Absolute reflection is the full 
exposition of  all the logically possible moments of the logos, a process that 
is completed as soon as the logos is folded back onto itself" (54).  Within 
the frame of totality, reflection, self-reflexivity, (!.nd their mediation are 
annulled in "absolute indifference"  (54).  Totality in Hegel, then, is 
conceived as the "unity  ofitself and  ofthe disunion that such  a unity  must 
presuppose" (57). 
Gasche characterises Hegel's critique as a climax in the philosophy 
of reflection and then proceeds to list a number of criticisms aimed at 
disproving or bypassing the law of totality.  One such critique, the 
rejection of reflexivity by logical positivism, is given short shrift: "Exor-
cising reflexivity from the discourse of philosophy through positivistic 
and analytic arguments could only be a short-lived and short-sighted 
way  of  dealing with the problem" (75). Likewise, John L.Austin'sspeech 
act resolution to the propositional bias is described, somewhat harshly, 
as "nothing more or less than the surreptitious reintroduction of the 
problem of reflection" which hinges "the entire representational func-
tion of language ...  on a constituting self-reflexivity of the linguistic act" 
(76). Gasche much prefers Herbert Schnadelbach'  s approach inReflexion 
und Diskurs, Fragen einer Logik der Philosophie 3which avoids the flaws of 
a mentalist theory by grounding reflection in a Habermasian theory of 
discourse.  But the way out of the Hegelian aporia of totality, according 
to Gasche, leads in a very different direction.  This is the topic of the 
concluding chapter of Part I,  "Beyond Reflection: The Interlacings of 
Heterology." 
Such alternative perspectives can be found in Nietzsche ("nosce te 
ipsum  would be the recipe for ruin"), Dilthey ("'Life' forever escapes 
reflection"; it is "the non-reflexive source of reflection and self-reflec-
tion"), Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, Jasper, or Heidegger (81). What their 
very different positions have in common is the heterogeneity of both 
reflection and self-reflection. Heidegger in particular is singled out as a 
precursor of Derrida'  s heterologous approach.  Instead of regarding 
reflection as philosophical unification, Heidegger foregrounds struc-
tures which "serve as path-breaking, breaching traces, according to 
which the  manifold,  the contradictory,  is  laid  out"  (85).  Likewise, 
Derrida's style of enquiry is seen as a critical search for the "ultimate 
foundation of all possible knowledge," not in terms of positing a totality, 
but on the contrary by way of a non-essential heterology. 
At the centre of Gasche'  s introduction to Derrida'  s procedure is the 
Platonic symploke, or weaving, in the most advanced form of which 
opposite strands are intertwined.  Symploke reappears in Husserl, Hei-
degger, Freud and others as Verflechtung and Geflecht, and in Derrida as 
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l'entrelacement:  "dialectics is also an art of weaving, a science of sum-
ploke."4  But Derrida's weaving process does not in the end produce a 
totalisation; indeed, his heterology questions the very possibility of a 
foundational  principle.  In this sense, heterology is  neither strictly 
philosophical nor literary; rather, it turns to the paradoxical form of the 
regress us of an infinite chain of  mirrors reflecting objects and themselves 
at  the same time. This new generalisation of reflexivity, Gasche suggests, 
constitutes "the end of reflection and speculation" (102). 
An  important consequence of replacing the homogeneity of  totalisa-
tion in reflection by a radical heterology is that the notion of the Other, 
e.g. negativity, which in the former is stipulated as unitary, becomes in 
Derrida's work irretrievably plural, a chain of undecidables, a field of 
radical alterity.  Or, as Gasche puts it, "the Otherness of unconditional 
heterology is the undecidable reserve of negativity" (104). It  is from this 
reserve,  Derrida  says,  that  "dialectics  draws  its  philosophemes" 
(Disseminations,  127).  Yet the alterity of heterology cannot yield the 
formal emptiness of logical principles; rather, it always points to a certain 
"irreducible impurity" (104), a certain conceptual contamination. 
The centre piece of The Tain of the Mirror, entitled "On Deconstruc-
tion," focuses on three main concerns: the immediate philosophical 
sources of deconstruction, its methodological tools,  and the general 
system which emerges from Derrida'  s writing. That Gasche should wish 
to return to Husserl and Heidegger in order to show how Derrida'  s 
concept of deconstruction develops does not mean that Derrida is being 
dragged  back to philosophical origins he is at  pains to escape. It  is helpful 
at  this point to remember that Derrida initially used the word deconstruc-
tion as a translation of Heidegger'  s Destruktion5 and that both Husserl in 
Ideas and  Heidegger  throughout  his work employed the term Destruktion 
rather than Zerstorung.  For the Germanised Latin of Destruktion retains 
the contradiction between the prefix "de-" and "struere" (to build), while 
in the German Zerstorung  both the prefix "zer" (apart) and "storung" 
(disturbance) collude in producing the sense of chaos. 
Gasche discovers traces of deconstruction in Heidegger'  s Being and 
Time 6of 1927where Destruktion in the sense of kritischer Abbau (critical 
dismantling) plays a decisive methodological role. In the later The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger writes, "there necessarily belongs 
to the conceptual interpretation of being and its structures, that is, to the 
reductive construction of being, a Destrucktion - a critical process in 
which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be em-
ployed are deconstructed (subjected to kritischem Abbau) down to  the 
sources from which they were drawn."7 Like Derrida'  s use of the texts of 
the past, Heidegger's interest in early Western philosophy is not a 
"historical return ... a return to a beginning ... that never occurred as 
such" (116).  And. yet, Gasche argues, although both Heidegger and 
Derrida strive for a discourse outside of metaphysics, it is only the latter 
who manages to escape from that system. 
In the chapter "Deconstructive Methodology" Gasche describes the 
major devices by which Derrida studies, in his own words, "the philo-
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specificity and diversity of its textual types,  [and]  in its models of 
exposition and  production.  "8 Central to Derrida'  s critique is the dubious 
assumption of the purity of concepts, since, after all, "the property of a 
concept depends entirely on its difference from the excluded concept," 
a difference which contaminates the formal structures of conceptuality 
(129). Furthermore, concepts are always members of systems in which 
they are bound to other concepts ''by virtue of the differential play'' (129) 
and so are affected differently in different discursive constellations. It is 
such "discursive inequalities" and "discrepancies" which Gasche shows 
Derrida has discovered in standard philosophical procedures. But these 
"variegated discursive and conceptual disparities"  are not,  Gasche 
points out, reduced to "one model of divergency' (135), they are instead 
made to yield the generality and irreducibility of heterologous elements. 
From this Gasche concludes that "deconstruction is ... the attempt to 
account for  the heterogeneity constitutive of philosophical discourse,  not by 
trying to overcome its inner differences but by maintaining them "(135; my 
stress). 
Before detailing Derrida'  s toolkit of "infrastructures" Gasche warns 
that  deconstruction must  not  be  confused  with  a process of neutralisation 
or annulment; that on  the contrary it aims at  foregrounding the asymmet-
rical nature of philosophy and its "violent hierarchy."9  What, then, 
Gasche asks, does deconstruction do with philosophical contradictions? 
It attempts to deal with them by way of founding them in "infrastruc-
tures" (142). Gasche sees Derrida'  s infrastructural "grounding" of philo-
sophical constructs as one of his major contributions to philosophy. On 
the one hand, infrastructures operate as "formal rules" which regulate, 
always differently, "the play of the contradictions in question" (142); on 
the other, their application requires the inclusion in the procedure of the 
speaking subject's self-consciousness. 
According to  Gasche,  infrastructures can be understood best in 
relation to the concept of structure. "To know why  one says 'structure,"' 
writes Derrida, "is to know why one no longer wishes to say eidos, 
'essence,' 'form,' Gestalt, 'ensemble,' 'composition,' 'complex' ... 'total-
ity,' 'Idea,' 'organism' ... 'system."'10  At the same time Derrida has led 
us to see what "structure" owes to those other concepts, namely "clo-
sure"  (144).  By  contrast, infrastructures are  plural and constitute a 
"connection, ratio,  rapport  " which can account for  "the differences, 
contradictions, aporias, or inconsistencies between concepts,  levels, 
argumentative and textual arrangements"  (147).  Gasche interprets 
Derrida's infrastructures as prelogical, synthetic and strategic devices. 
One such infrastructure, differance, is said to precede the oppositions of 
being and nothingness, or presence and absence. Its synthetic character 
emerges in the form of its "intermediary discourse" bringing to the fore 
"a middle in which the differends are suspended and preserved"; and it 
has a strategic economy in the sense that it can account for "a maximum 
of phenomena with a minimum of concepts and logical traits" (151, 153). 
But, according to GascM, it would be a misrepresentation of the 
Derridean enterprise if  one were to assume that infrastructures can  act as 
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concepts are generated, engendered, or produced is replaced in decon-
struction by that of "inscription" which contextualises and so heterolo-
gises unitary concepts. As such, inscription, "or mise en rapport," is seen 
as a strategy of "accounting'' (161), not in terms of writing a critical 
inventory but with the aim of "overturning and displacing the concep-
tual order'' (Margins of Philosophy, 329). Nor is there the security of a 
logical point of departure:  "we must begin wherever we are :  in a text 
where we already believe ourselves to be.'111  The unavoidable "meta-
physical complicity'' (Writing and Difference, 281), or Derrida's return to 
philosophical oppositions, together with a procedure of displacement 
amounts, as Gasche shows, to a "double gesture" (172), the asymmetrical 
structure of which sets it radically apart from traditional reflection. 
In "A System Beyond Being," the concluding chapter of Part II, 
Gasche interrelates Derrida'  s various infrastructures into a network. The 
arche-trace is summed up as a "structure of referral" in that it allows us 
to inscribe differences between terms and entities (223, 190); differance is 
the non-unitary ground for all possible kinds of differentiation, differing 
and deferring; supplementarity  "designates the law according to which 
the possibility of the unbreached plenitude of an entity is dependent on 
the absence of an Other" (223); iterability marks the relation between 
repetition and alteration and so acts as a critique of pure identity; and 
lastly, the re-mark  is that infrastructure which in preventing terms and 
concepts from achieving closure "accounts both for the necessary illu-
sion  oftotalization and  for its simultaneous displacements" (218). Yetthe 
"system" of infrastructures, i.e.  the fact that they all serve the same 
critical motivation, should not lead us, Gasche cautions, to construe them 
as a unity, or worse, another totality. Such a move would mean a return 
to the surface of the mirror. What is required, and what deconstruction 
offers, is the possibility of looking through the reflective surface "at the 
tain of the mirror"  (238). 
Nevertheless, what allows the heterology of infrastructures to oper-
ate as a system of sorts is not any shared semantic field, but a quasisyn-
tactical relationship; they act like syncategoremata or  function words. In 
this sense, Gasche suggests, Derrida'  s infrastructural system could be 
characterised as a philosophical grammar of an indefinite number of 
final and "overdetermined syntactical objectivities" (249). 
The third part of Rodolphe Gasche's study addresses the relation-
ship of philosophy and literature in Derrida's work. Again, historically 
and conceptually Gasche discovers a far greater degree of systematicity 
in Derrida's writings than the critical commentaty has led us to believe 
existed.  Since Aristotle's Poetics  literature has been understood as a 
pursuit of the signified at the expense of the specificity of the signifier. 
But even the more recent search for literariness by Mallarme and the 
Russian Formalists is unmasked as a continuation of the "logocentric 
subjugation" (257) which fetters "the play of form  to a determined sub-
stance of expression"(Of Grammatology, 59).  As Gasche neatly sums up 
Derrida's twin attack:  "mimetologism and literarity are the birth and 
death of literature" (257).  From this basis Derrida is shown to launch his 
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because it is monological and ultimately always a form oftotalisation; 
polysemic thematics  merely conceals and postpones its "horizon of the 
final parousia of a meaning at last deciphered, revealed, made present 
in the rich collection of its determinations" (Disseminations, 350); while 
fonnalist and structuralist criticism  are dismissed as insufficient both on 
account of their inability to address the historical inscriptions in the text 
and their failure to come to terms with the specificity of signification. At 
the end of his analysis of Derrida's critique of literary readings Gasche 
points out that Derrida himself has not provided a systematic exposition 
of particular literary infrastructures; they have to be derived from the 
general system which can be demonstrated. On the other hand, Gasche 
alleges,  literary deconstructive criticism has illegitimately borrowed 
such terms as "supplementarity," "mise en abyme," or "re-mark," with-
out being able to grasp their concepts in terms of a debate with philoso-
phy. 
The concluding chapter, "The Inscription of Universality," discusses 
three issues: writing, text and metaphor. As to writing, Gasche outlines 
how Derrida is able to  link the conceptual condemnation of writing 
with its unacknowledged, metaphorical rehabilitation.  From Plato to 
Saussure this contradiction between writing's condemnation and its 
unavoidable use in  making that very point has  characterised philosophy. 
Gasche traces Derrida'  s argument  from the unmasking  of that contradic-
tion, which rests once more on  a totalisation, to the redefinition of writing 
as the plurality and operation of referring to "irreducible Otherness, of 
grafting one form of writing onto another" (277). 
In a similar vein Gasche details the systemic way in which Derrida 
theorises the notion of the text. His generalised concept of text subsumes 
its three definitions: as "empirically encounterable transcription of oral 
discourse"; as "signifying organization"; and as "the dialectical subla-
tion, either as 'form' or 'content,' of both its sensible and ideal determi-
nations" (278-79).  Atthe same time "text" no longer has any  boundaries. 
It  is at this point that Gasche warns against reading "il n'y a pas dehors-
texte" (Of Grammatology, 158) to mean  the text is about itself. For Derrida 
could as well have written, "there is no inside of the text" (281). The text 
does of course also refer to itself, Gasche concedes, but such a reading 
never arrives at a final destination. Far from being a literary argument, 
Derrida's "general text" is described as belonging to a debate mainly 
with Heidegger, in the sense that the text could be regarded as "the 
unthoughtofBeing."Constitutedbytracesratherthansignsthe"general 
text" allows for the "margin of the opposition of texts and textuality"; it 
is "the frame of the textual difference" (288). 
Finally, the book presents a commentary on the term "metaphor." 
Here  Gasche reminds us that for Derrida metaphor  is part  of a fundamen-
tal critique of philosophy rather than merely an  item in a rhetorical game. 
Because Derrida deconstructs metaphor, he is able not only to broach its 
opposite, the proper or literal, but  also to move to the more general level . 
of metaphoricity as a "structure that accounts for the difference between 
the figural and the proper" (295). Gasche further suggests that Derrida'  s 
treatment of metaphor is an extension of Heidegger's "as-structures" (as 
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what, as such ) which underlie all forms of understanding. Ideation, for 
example, is shown to be "the intuition of the as  what of species and 
singularities" (306). Through tropes, then, can we discover the "non-
essence" of the proper, and so conceptual universality can be described 
as derivative of metaphoricity.  But when everything turns out to  be 
metaphorical, Gasche notes, both metaphor and the proper disappear, 
and it  is for this reason that Derrida introduces the notion of "quasimeta-
phoricity," or the "source" of the universality of concepts. In this sense, 
Gasche believes, quasi-metaphoricity achieves a double displacement of 
the Heideggerian Being, since it is inscribed in a system of differences 
and so becomes "merely a function of quasimetaphoricity'' (314). 
This is one ofthe points in  The Tain of the Mirror where Gasche asserts 
rather than argues; another similar one being his assumption, uncriti-
cally transferred from "Differance," that differance has replaced the 
ontico-ontological difference.12  Both contentions may well turn  out to be 
acceptable, but they require a  more carefully argued case.  Gasche 
concludes his study  by  stressing once more that Derrida'  s metaphoricity 
operates at a more generallevel than  that employed in  literature and that 
deconstructive criticism must take philosophical enquiry seriously if it 
wishes to avoid the common falsification of Derrida's concerns. 
The  Tain  of the  Mirror:  Derrida  and  the  Philosophy  of Reflection  is 
competently published by Harvard University Press.  It should be 
regarded as an indispensable source of information for teachers and 
students alike and the most authoritative introduction to  Derrida's 
writings available to date. 
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